Tyrants have traditionally used elaborate procedures and ceremonies to make their exercise of power acceptable to the public while simultaneously denying due process of law. They use independent judicial systems along lines generally accepted in law. However, a closer look at these systems shows that administrators absolutely control them by simultaneously assuming the roles of prosecution, defense, judge, and jury. They call these procedures "risk management protocols" to hide the "kangaroo court" stigma. A kangaroo court conducts its business without regard to the rights of one or both parties.

These "courts" conduct their business without regard for the rights of individuals. Decisions result from foregone conclusions made in secret and based upon political or other bias of the judges. Administrators frequently convene them to deny due process and to cover up their own crimes that legitimate hearings would expose. The whole procedure characterizes dishonesty by violating established legal procedures. Moreover, these proceedings emulate Star Chamber proceedings used with increasing arbitrariness to enforce royal prerogative in the seventeenth century. Truly democratic governments have outlawed them since then.

Several agencies operate "risk management" policies that amount to no more than denial of due process of law. For example, the University of Washington (UW) has a system of self-regulation that amounts to no regulation at all. It allows administrators to investigate themselves and find themselves not guilty. This initially operates through procrastination and kill-the-messenger techniques to delay justice which effectively denies it.

UW frequently convenes kangaroo courts then convicts its victims in absentia when forced to address issues by more tenacious complainants. Then, Washington State Executive Ethics Board (EEB) and the attorney general come into the play with general denial and denial of rights in pari materia.. They avoid hearing ethics complaints against university employees and others by using these ploys. EEB arbitrarily dismisses complaints for lack of evidence without considering the evidence submitted or even recording the complaint. By that, it condones the violations that the legislature intended it to thwart. In fact, it has now become part of the problem and not the solution in addressing unethical behavior by agencies. EEB participates in the malfeasance as an accessory after the fact.

In Washington state, when individuals file EEB complaints they receive short shrift. EEB consistently overlays another set of unlawful strategies onto the unlawful decisions already made by agencies. For example, Margaret A. Grimaldi, Executive Secretary, Executive Ethics Board, State of Washington (the Secretary), extravagantly interprets the ethics statutes and construes law to support a general denial as defined by court rules.⁽¹⁾

These denials do not fairly address the substance of the averments. EEB does not shown good faith by specifying the parts considered true and material and denying only the remainder. Instead, the Secretary rebuts all allegations in the complaint. She uses her own interpretation and construction to refuse filing of complaints that clearly meet all the requirements of the statutes.⁽²⁾ Moreover, she refuses to accept pleadings for filing solely on the grounds that they do not conform with her understanding of the statute: a decision also contrary to court rules,⁽³⁾

The Secretary has stated that:

The Executive Ethics Board's jurisdiction is limited to chapter 42.52 RCW, the state's ethics law. Therefore, we will not investigate, nor respond to, conduct that is alleged to violate other provisions of state law.⁽⁴⁾

However, the ethics and public disclosure statutes relate in pari materia because they address the same subject matter. In pari materia means that the Secretary must consider the ethics statute in relation to all other statutes having the same purpose. She must read them together and in connection as though they constitute one law. This rule insures that she carries into effect the intent of the legislature. It also insures governance of several statutes by one spirit or policy especially when their several parts and provisions clearly harmonize.⁽⁵⁾ Moreover, the public disclosure act clearly supplements the ethics act because it covers the same issues. In fact, the ethics act explicitly cites the public disclosure act, thus:

No state officer or state employee may intentionally conceal a record if the officer or employee knew the record was required to be released under chapter 42.17 RCW, was under a personal obligation to release the record, and failed to do so.⁽⁶⁾

Washington statutes have provided for liberal construction of laws since 1881.⁽⁷⁾ They have consistently and clearly stated that no limitation by any rule of strict construction may apply to their interpretation. Liberal construction gives a statute a broad meaning not necessarily included in its narrow or literal interpretation. This results from combining and correlating supplementary laws that address similar issues to form a definitive whole. The process helps accomplish both the intent and spirit of the law when it remains silent on a particular issue. In this case, the law has not remained silent but clearly refers to the law cited in the complaint. The Act mandates a liberal construction when applied to laws that relate to the same subject, thus:

This chapter [42.52 RCW] shall be construed liberally to effectuate its purposes and policy and to supplement existing laws as may relate to the same subject.⁽⁸⁾

The term "interpretation" has less scope than the term "construction." Interpretation precedes construction and stops at the written text. Interpretation discovers sense and meaning whereas construction explains legal effects and consequences.⁽⁹⁾ This gives the court direction when it lacks express or implied intent. Interpretation describes the process by which one person gives meaning to the symbols of expression used by another person. For example, interpretation of an agreement, and the terms within it, defines its meaning. However, the subsequent construction of that agreement determines its legal effect. Construction causes legal consequences, according to laws applicable in any given situation, based upon the interpreted terms and context of the agreement.⁽¹⁰⁾

All interpretation detects the purpose and intent of the parties to an agreement. Words do not define themselves because language exists as a defective and uncertain instrument. Neither do terms and sentences in an agreement apply themselves to external objects or performances. Their meaning only consists of ideas induced by a person using, hearing, or reading them. For example, the words of an agreement seldom convey meaning to the contracting or third parties in litigation: hence the reason for the litigation. Consequently, interpretive processes do not provide absolutes. They provide a set of working rules not a dogma because biased assertions lead to a belief that language has only one meaning: an absolutely correct meaning.⁽¹¹⁾

Interpretation of law has historically remained a function of the judiciary because administrative interpretations thwart the purpose for giving the courts their power. Interpreting a statute primarily discovers its objectives and gives effect to the intent of the legislature.⁽¹²⁾ Therefore, all judicial interpretations must achieve legislative objectives. This even applies when a general objective may appear inconsistent with a literal reading of particular facts.⁽¹³⁾ When the legislature has spoken, courts may interpret but not add or take away from clear and unambiguous meaning of law. If they do, then they write new legislation instead of interpreting policy. Consequently, statutory expediency and wisdom remain legislative prerogatives not granted to the judiciary or to administrators.⁽¹⁴⁾ Therefore, only the courts have the power to interpret the statutes. The Secretary may not arbitrarily decide their meaning.

Legislative intent must prevail under any rule of construction whether strict or liberal. ⁽¹⁵⁾ Moreover, liberal construction requires that exceptions have a narrow definition and that the statutes generally have a broad definition. ⁽¹⁶⁾

The Washington State legislature has determined in 42.52 RCW that:

Ethics in government are the foundation on which the structure of government rests. State officials and employees of government hold a public trust that obligates them, in a special way, to honesty and integrity in fulfilling the responsibilities to which they are elected and appointed. . . . State officials and employees are subject to the sanctions of law and scrutiny of the media; ultimately, however, they are accountable to the people and must consider this public accountability as a particular obligation of the public service. Only when affairs of government are conducted, at all levels, with openness as provided by law and an unswerving commitment to the public good does government work as it should. ⁽¹⁷⁾

The courts have ruled that statutes in pari materia should harmonize to give force and effect to each other.⁽¹⁸⁾ This requires reconciliation of statutes that apply to the same subject matter.⁽¹⁹⁾ The courts must study the entire sequence of these statutes (including earlier enactments) before acting upon them⁽²⁰⁾ , in other words, they must follow the manifest purposes of legislation.⁽²¹⁾ They must also give meaning to the statutes consonant with legislative policy.⁽²²⁾ Moreover, the purpose of all technical rules of statutory construction must uphold the obvious purpose that the legislature attempts to achieve.⁽²³⁾

Consequently, spirit and intent prevail over the letter of the law.⁽²⁴⁾ To achieve the intent of the legislation, the courts try to follow the spirit of statutory enactments and not the precise letter of them. This avoids constructions leading to gross injustice or absurdity. To do this, the courts study the statutory text as a whole, including any amendments, and consider all related statutes on the same subject matter. They then interpret the statute in terms of its general object and purpose while contemplating the future.⁽²⁵⁾

The general denial by the Secretary of EEB complaints does not meet these criteria because she has neglected to construe the statutes in pari materia. The law does not allow the Secretary to deny a filing, to make interpretive rulings, or construe meaning. However, she has not only denied filing but also interpreted rules by deciding the general object and purpose of the Act. She has then construed meaning from her own interpretation: all functions beyond her purview. By law, the Secretary must accept a filing and record it. She must then read the statutes contained in the pleading together as a whole to arrive at a meaning and effect that satisfies the overall legislative purpose and intent.⁽²⁶⁾

Consequently, EEB chokes any independent investigation that could place an agency in a bad light. Moreover, the attorney general picks hack investigators from her staff when forced to investigate recorded complaints. These hacks know how to bring investigations to a quick and meaningless end by intimidating witnesses and coercing complainants. In addition, the attorney general organizes bureaucratic shell games among the EEB, the state auditor, the legislative ethics board, and her own office. These games delay due process so that no viable decision results.

The use of kangaroo courts, and subsequent strategies to defend them, effectively gags complainants from protesting politically-motivated prosecution and decision making. The Executive Ethics Board has become a means of extending and condoning those unlawful activities. Neither of these "tribunals" has substance in law yet they decide despite facts. They then use their findings to bring political retribution upon complainants and whistle blowers to cover up their own unlawful activities. They repeatedly delay justice then deny it.

Nmesis.

1. Washington State Court Rules (1999), Civil Rules for Courts of Limited Jurisdiction (CRLJ), 3. Pleadings and Motions, Rule 8(b), 469.

2. WAC 292-100-030. Procedures for Filing complaints.

3. Washington State Court Rules (1999), Civil Rules for Courts of Limited Jurisdiction (CRLJ), 5.Service and Filing of Pleadings and other Papers, Rule 5(e), 469.

4. Margaret A. Grimaldi, Executive Secretary, Executive Ethics Board, State of Washington (MAG/09.21.99).

5. State ex rel. American Piano Co. v. Superior Court (1919) 105 Wash. 676; Paltro v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. (1922) 204 P. 1044; 119 Wash. 101; and State v. Houck (1949) 32 Wn.2d 684.

6. RCW 42.52.050(4) Confidential Information - Improperly Concealed Records.

7. State of Washington, Code 1881 § 1686.

8. RCW 42.52.901. Liberal Construction.

9. Union Trust Co. (1915) 89 Misc. 69, 151 N.Y.S. 246, 249.

10. Berg v. Hudesman 115 Wn.2d. 663, 801 P.2d 222.

11. Berg v. Hudesman 115 Wn.2d. 664, 801 P.2d 222.

12. Janovich v. Herron (1979) 91 Wash.2d 767, 592 P.2d 1096 and State ex rel. Tarver v. Smith (1970) 78 Wash.2d 201, 470 P.2d 172.

13. Murphy v. Campbell Invest. Co. (1971) 79 Wash.2d 417, 486 P2d 1080.

14. Ransom v. South Bend (1913) 76 Wash. 396, 136 P. 365.

15. Shorts v. Seattle (1917) 95 Wash. 531, 164 P.239.

16. Vogt v. Seattle-First National Bank (1991) 117 Wn.2d 552.

17. RCW 42.52.900. Legislative Declaration.

18. Pannell v. Thompson (1979) 91 Wash.2d 591, 589 P.2d 1235 and Davis v. King County (1970) 77 Wash.2d 930, 468 P.2d 679.

19. State v. Zornes (1970) 78 Wash.2d 9, 475 P.2d 109.

20. Donnelly Estate (1972) 81 Wash.2d 430, 502 P.2d 1163 and Greenwood v. State Board for Community College Education (1973) 82 Wash.2d 667, 513 P.2d 57.

21. State v. Lee (1963) 62 Wash.2d 228, 382 P.2d 491.

22. State v. Robinson (1912) 67 Wash.2d 425.

23. State v. Coffey (1970) 77 Wash.2d. 630, 465 P.2d 665.

24. Upjohn v. Russell (1983) 33 Wash.App 777, 658 P.2d 27 and Janovich v. Herron (1979) 91 Wash.2d 767, 592 P.2d 1096.

25. Amburn v. Daly (1972) 81 Wash.2d 241, 501 P.2d 178.

26. State v. Rother (1971) 78 Wash.2d 711, 479 P.2d 55.